be construed according to the grammatical and ordinary sense”
106
or the
natural sense”
107
of the actual words employed in the Act.
108
Read the words
in their plain, natural or
literal sense, see what they mean and there is the
answer to any question of interpretation.
109
This formulation
of the literal rule certainly would make
interpretation a
deductive process. If resorting to the plain meaning of words will resolve the
ambiguity, the syllogism for interpretation works. However, just by flipping
through an English dictionary, it can be seen that this is not the case. Most
words have more than one meaning, and even one use of a word can have
shades of meaning.
110
Moreover, there are other forms of ambiguity.
111
Consequently, there is not one simple, literal meaning for each word.
An obvious consequence follows. The literal rule of interpretation cannot be
the basis of a syllogism for interpreting
law because it does not yield an
objective indisputable answer to questions of interpretation.
Finally, this analysis indicates that the common formulation of the literal rule,
described above, is untenable and in fact meaningless. In fact, as later
discussion demonstrates, the proper purpose of the literal rule is to limit the
scope of interpretation so that a court cannot adopt an interpretation that is not
reasonably open to it from the words of the statute.
112
Preformed Policy
Some might claim that interpreting law is syllogistic if a court interprets law by
reference to a preformed policy. Preformed policy refers to policy that has
already been formed. Typically it is the policy of the legislature in making the
legal rule that is now before the court.
To expand this, assume that a legislature has enacted Statute X. When it
enacted Statute X the legislature intended the statute to achieve Effect X.
113
When a court comes to interpret Statute X one interpretive option is to
interpret the statute that will advance the achievement of Effect X. In other
___________________
106
Australasian
Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society v Howe
(1922) 21 CLR 290, 302
107
Vacher v London Society of Compositors [1913] AC 107, 149
108
Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society v Howe
(1922) 21 CLR 290, 302
109
Avel Pty Ltd v Attorney General (1987) 11 NSWLR 126, 127 per Kirby P
110
Christopher Enright Legal Method Chapter 10 Classifying Meanings
111
Christopher Enright Legal Method Chapter 10 Classifying Meanings
112
Chapter 30 Model for Forming Law
113
This concept is explained in Chapter 30 Model for Forming Law.
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