Act defines the verb “run” the definition applies, with appropriate
modifications, to variations such as “running” and “ran”.
A common assumption of beginners is to think that definitions reveal the
meaning of terms which were hitherto mysterious. This, however, is not the
case. Instead definitions enable Acts to be briefer and easier to read by using a
few words in the text of the Act in substitution for a larger and more
complicated set of words in the definition. So, while checking definitions is
functionally part of the process of interpretation, it is usually doing no more
than assembling the text of the Act in full form.
There is another reason, that, despite their name, definitions do not definitively
and conclusively determine what a word or phrase means. Definitions are a
batch of words because they substitute one set of words for another. Being
words they may, themselves, require interpretation.
Operation
The engine room of a definition provides that one expression in an Act, Y, is
equated with, or incorporated into, some other expression, X. Commonly
when Y is equated with X the
Act may say that “X means Y” and when X
incorporates Y the Act says “X includes Y”. However other expressions are
used.
Equated With
Commonly the verb “means” is used as the formula for asserting an equation
between two sets of words. However, some other
expressions are used as
well. These include “deemed,” “shall be held” and evidentiary provisions.
Means
Where an Act says “X means Y” the Act is saying that X is equated with Y.
Therefore to understand the statute effectively you have to delete the reference
to X and insert Y. “Means” is therefore exhaustive because it provides a
complete substitute for the term defined.
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For example, if a definition says
that “vehicle means a motor car or motor cycle,” the effect is that wherever the
Act says “vehicle,” you must blot out “vehicle” and insert (or read the Act as
if said) “motor car or motor cycle”. Frequently where the “X means Y” type
of definition is used, Y will be a series of terms or a complex concept because
the usual reason for having this form of definition is economy rather than
clarity. To illustrate, if an Act is laying down common provisions for houses,
Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) s24, Interpretation Act 1984
(WA) s9, Interpretation Act
(NT) s23, Interpretation Act 1979 (NI) s16, Interpretation Act 1967 (ACT) s14B.
760
Sherrin Gordon Mines v FCT
(1976) 10 ALR 441, 445, Douglas v Minister for
Aboriginal Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 192, 203
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