This same reasoning applies in relation to phrases as well as sentences. In
some cases it may be better to take a phrase as a whole rather than to take the
individual words in the phrase because usage gives the real meaning to the
phrase. In other words, the real meaning of a phrase it is not necessarily
derived from a simple accumulation of the meaning of the individual words
that constitute the phrase.
421
As well as words it is permissible and necessary to look at any parts of the
statute, such as the preamble,
422
headings, schedules and notes. In other
words, anything in the statute may be relevant.
Other Statutes
Context also includes other statutes that might be relevant. These include the
statute’s predecessor and successor, related statutes, and other statutes on the
same subject in the enacting jurisdiction or in other jurisdictions.
423
Other Matters
Other matters may be relevant. These would include the existing state of the
law, the mischief that the statute sought to remedy, and prevailing social
conditions.
Efficacy and Validity
Courts should construe provisions so that they are effective, necessary and
constitutionally valid. This is expressed in the maxim, ut res magis valeat
quam pereat
(that the provision may be operative rather than inoperative). It
has three spheres of operation. (i) Statutes are construed so that each word
and phrase is necessary, that is, it contributes to the statute's meaning.
Consequently, one does not construe a word or phrase in a way that renders
another word or phrase meaningless or redundant, unless this is absolutely
unavoidable.
424
Putting this another way, if a statute is conceived as a play,
every word must speak its part. This is the presumption against surplus words,
which has been discussed above. (ii) A second aspect of the valeat maxim is
that courts should, where possible, read down a statutory provision to ensure
that it is within the power of the legislature concerned. This maxim is relevant
when there is a challenge to the validity of a statute as beyond the
421
Thus in FCT v Launceston Legacy (1987) 75 ALR 122 the court thought that it
was necessary to interpret the phrase "public benevolent institution" as a
composite phrase rather than word by word.
422
Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 461
423
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408 per
Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ
424
Beckwith v R (1976) 12 ALR 333, Raven Coal Corporation v Absher 153 Va 332,
149 SE 541 (1929). The court refused to apply this presumption in Despoja v Durack
(1979) 27 ALR 466, 472.
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