In this diagram, for the sake of the illustration, it is assumed that Meaning X
equates with (
) Meaning 1 and that Effect Y equates with (
) Effect 2. This
diagram now enables us to examine the three possibilities that a court might
face:
(1)
The legislature expresses an intention for a particular meaning. This is
illustrated by Meaning X in the diagram. The court, therefore, interprets the
provision by choosing as legally correct Meaning 1 because this is the meaning
that the legislature itself has chosen. In this case the legislature can be taken to
have judged and approved of the effect that this meaning will cause (Effect 1 in
the diagram). This is, however, of no direct concern to the court.
(2)
The legislature expresses an intention for a desired effect. This is
illustrated by Effect Y in the diagram, which equates with Effect 2. In this case
the court should seek to interpret the provision in a manner that brings about
this effect. This leaves it for the court to judge which of the possible meanings
of the ambiguous provision will cause this effect or best cause it. This is
Meaning 2 in the diagram because it is predicted to cause Effect 2. In this case
the court finds that Meaning 2 is the best because it causes the effect that the
legislature judges to be the best.
(3)
The legislature expresses an intention for both a meaning and an effect.
This presents no problem if, in the court’s view, the chosen meaning causes
the chosen effect. If it
does
not the court has a dilemma. To the extent that
there can be a general rule for resolving this dilemma, the rational view is based
on the premise that the purpose of a law is to cause an effect. Therefore,
ordinarily, a court should accept the legislature’s choice of effect, and use its
own judgment as to which meaning will cause this effect.
348
Problems
When interpreting by reference to original legislative intent there may be
problems. A major source of these problems is failure to satisfy the conditions
required for a court to interpret law by reference to statutory policy if the
interpretation is to be properly effective. These conditions are as follows:
(1)
Condition 1: Existence of the Policy. There is a policy behind the Act.
(2)
Condition 4: Completeness of the Policy. The policy fully identifies the
effects which the Act is intended to cause.
(3)
Condition 3: Clarity of the Policy. The policy is unambiguous.
(4)
Condition 2: Source of the Policy. There is an authentic source of this
policy.
(5)
Condition 5: Effects of Meanings. It is clear as to the effect that each
meaning of the ambiguous provision will cause.
(6)
Condition 6: Matching of Effects. One of these effects, or two or more
of them, unequivocally constitute one or more of the intended effects of
the
Act (ie its object and purpose).
348
An illustration is United Steel Workers v Weber (1979) 443 US 193.
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