Noscitur a Sociis
Noscitur a sociis means, literally, that something is known by its associates. It
is encapsulated in the proverb that birds of a feather flock together. The most
obvious example of its use is to restrict the scope of words by reference to
other words in their immediate context. For example, in Prior v Sherwood
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the court held that a prohibition on bookmaking in any "house, office, room or
place" did not extend to a public lane. Although "place" is a word of
potentially wide ambit, and could possibly cover a public lane, it was read
down in that context to mean a place that was akin to a house, office or room,
that is, a place in a building. In a similar vein, in R v Refshauge a reference to
“qualifications” in a section providing for registration of medical practitioners
was read to mean academic qualifications and not personal or any other
qualifications.
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Eiusdem Generis
Eiusdem generis (literally, of the same kind) is similar to noscitur a sociis. It is
directed at the situation where an Act lists a number of specific items then
adds a more general
one. One possible view of this is that the legislature
intends that the general item should be read to include only those of the same
kind or genus as the specific ones. To illustrate, s123A(1) of the Income Tax
Assessment Act 1936 allowed a deduction for expenditure on “a railway, road,
pipeline or other facility”. The general expression “other facility” was read to
mean a facility for moving goods, and thus excluded a facility for storing
goods.
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It is this construction that is urged by the eiusdem generis rule. Essential to its
operation is that there exists a clear intention that the items are to be of the
same genus or class. If this intention is lacking, eiusdem generis will not apply
since, like all presumptions, it reflects only one possible view of the
legislature’s intention.
Generalia Specialibus
A presumption of interpretation, generalia specialibus non derogant (general
things do not detract from special ones), urges a court to read down a statute.
This presumption addresses the situation where there are two statutes covering
a case, an earlier statute dealing with a specific aspect of a subject and a later
dealing with the subject overall. In other words, it is a type of inconsistency.
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Prior v Sherwood (1906) 3 CLR 1054
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R v Refshauge (1976) 11 ALR 471, 475
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Canwan Coals v FCT (1974) 4 ALR 223
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